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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

9 June 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence  
FROM : William W. Wells  
Deputy Director for Operations  
SUBJECT : WARSAW PACT JOURNAL: The Experience Gained  
in Conducting Combined Exercises

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on articles from a ~~SECRET~~ Soviet publication called Information Collection of the Headquarters and the Technical Committee of the Combined Armed Forces. This article relates East German experience in conducting and participating in combined exercises with other Warsaw Pact forces. The author discusses three variants of command-staff exercises in which troops are allocated, and gives recommendations for providing realism and for efficient organization to achieve the desired results of joint participation. This journal is published by Warsaw Pact Headquarters in Moscow, and it consists of articles by Warsaw Pact officers. This article appeared in Issue No. 10, which was published in 1975.

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies. For ease of reference, reports from this publication have been assigned the

[redacted] Codeword [redacted]. [redacted]

William W. Wells

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## Intelligence Information Special Report

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COUNTRY EAST GERMANY/WARSAW PACT

DATE OF  
INFO. 1975

DATE 9 June 1977

SUBJECT

WARSAW PACT JOURNAL: The Experience Gained in Conducting  
Combined Exercises

SOURCE Documentary

Summary:

The following report is a translation from Russian of an article from a SECRET Soviet publication called Information Collection of the Headquarters and the Technical Committee of the Combined Armed Forces. This journal is published by Warsaw Pact Headquarters in Moscow, and it consists of articles by Warsaw Pact officers. This article was written by General-Leytenant F. Shtreletts. This article relates East German experience in conducting and participating in combined exercises with other Warsaw Pact forces. The author discusses three variants of command-staff exercises in which troops are allocated: with the troops placed on alert and brought in for a specific phase; with troops detailed for participation throughout the exercise and for specialized or cooperation training; and with troops performing demonstration exercises. The preparation and direction of combined exercises also are touched upon, with recommendations given for providing realism and for efficient organization to achieve the desired results of joint participation. This article appeared in Issue No. 10, which was published in 1975.

End of Summary


Comment:

The names of authors are given in Russian transliteration. Ranks of one-star (general-mayor) and two-star (general-leytenant) general officers are given in Russian for nationals of countries following the Soviet system. Fritz Streletz currently is identified as Secretary of the GDR National Defense Council.

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The Experience Gained in Conducting Combined Exercises

by

General-Leytenant F. Shtreletts,  
Deputy Chief for Operational Matters of the Main Staff  
of the National People's Army of the German Democratic Republic

In fulfilling the instructions of our party and government leadership, the requirements of the orders of the Minister of National Defense, and the directives of the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact member states, the National People's Army of the German Democratic Republic has participated in recent years in a number of combined training operational-tactical undertakings, including the exercises VLTAVA, ODER-NEISSE, BRATSTVO PO ORUZHIIYU (BROTHERHOOD-IN-ARMS), SHCHIT (SHIELD), BALTIKA (BALTIC), GRANIT (GRANITE), and others.

These combined measures contributed to improving the operational-tactical knowledge and skills of the generals, admirals, officers, and staffs, to increasing the level of field, naval, and air training of the branches of the armed forces, to strengthening and deepening the combat cooperation of the allied armies, and to educating personnel in the spirit of proletarian internationalism.

One should note the special consideration the Staff of the Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact member states gives to the accomplishment of these tasks, because the conduct of such exercises and exchange of experience in the matters of organizing these exercises contribute to a considerable degree to the improvement of mutual understanding and to the strengthening of a unity of views on the control, cooperation, and all-round support of the allied armies and fleets in their combined accomplishment of combat tasks.

The systematic improvement of the professional skill of command personnel within the framework of operational-tactical training on the basis of socialist military science is an essential prerequisite for the development of unified views and for the successful organization of combat actions and troop control in operations.



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Most of the command cadres of our army have been trained together with representatives of the other fraternal armies in the academies of the Soviet Armed Forces. The Military Academy i/n Friedrich Engels and other higher military educational institutions of the National People's Army collaborate closely with the higher military educational institutions of the Soviet Armed Forces and of the other fraternal armies. All of this provides the crucial prerequisite for the high theoretical training of the generals, admirals, and officers, and for the forming in them of unified views on the conduct of present-day combat actions within the complement of the Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact member states.

In order to develop in the generals and officers of the National People's Army of the German Democratic Republic unified views on matters of operational-tactical training, the following measures, based on our experience, have proven worthwhile:

-- periodic conferences and consultations of the command personnel of the allied armies of the Warsaw Pact member states over various matters of military art;

-- the exchange of documents and of military science works and their thorough analysis and synthesis.

However, taking these measures alone is still inadequate because they serve primarily for familiarization with new achievements in the field of military theory and for the synthesizing of the experience of the training of the staffs and troops.

But at the same time commanders and staff officers are in need of improving their own practical skills in controlling troops in the course of combined actions of groupings of allied troops. They acquire these skills primarily in the various exercises carried out according to the Plan of Combined Undertakings of the Combined Armed Forces.

Combined exercises enrich the theory of the military art of allied armies, improve the operational-tactical knowledge of commanders and staff officers, and make it possible to accomplish the matters of cooperation and troop control more effectively. At the same time, the level of combat readiness of the allied

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armies, and the quality of their combat equipment and of the combat skills of the personnel are verified in the exercises.

In our opinion, the experience gained in the combined exercises that have been carried out demonstrates distinctly that combined command-staff exercises with the allocation of troops (naval forces, rear services organs) to them are one of the effective forms of improving the operational-tactical training of staffs. Such exercises make it possible, without exceeding cost limitations, to achieve good results in matters of the practical training of commanders and staffs. In the exercises one can to a considerable degree establish conditions that ensure that the training closely approximates combined-arms exercises (exercises of air defense forces, aviation, naval forces) or maneuvers.

Based on the experience of our exercises, one can distinguish three principal variants of allocating troops (naval forces, aviation, rear services organs) to combined command-staff exercises.

The participation of large units and units (ships, rear services organs) in specific phases of an exercise

This variant in allocation is distinguished by the fact that the large units and units specified in the plan are alerted suddenly on the basis of a signal, brought into the exercise and subordinated to the commanders and staffs being trained after these have made their decision. The trainee commanders and staffs, in accordance with the decisions made and the plan of battle, command their subordinate large units and units as they accomplish combat tasks in the specific phase of the exercise. After working out the planned problems, the large units and units (ships, rear services organs) return to their permanent deployment areas (to home bases) or else they are assigned other tasks.

The commanders and staffs continue the command-staff exercise according to the plan, or, if the troops (naval forces) have participated in its final phase they return together with them. In doing this, as a rule, the allocation of large units and units (ships, rear services organs) will depend on the concept of the exercise and on the capabilities of the available training grounds.

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This manner of allocating troops is used primarily in order to check the realism of the decisions and calculations that are made. In addition, it makes it possible, under realistic conditions, to verify and improve the skills in practical troop control of commanders and staffs during the separate phases of a command-staff exercise.

The participation of large units and units (ships, rear services organs) during the entire course of a command-staff exercise

In this case, within large units there may be detailed units and subunits which, in accordance with the decisions and battle planning, will accomplish combat tasks in the zones and sectors assigned to them.

For participation in combined command-staff exercises it is advisable to detail first of all those subunits (units) which, in accordance with the nature of the combat tasks they are to fulfil, must cooperate most closely with each other. Thus, in the course of the command-staff exercise, there is afforded a good opportunity to work out in actual practice the matters of cooperation between the troops (naval forces) of allied armies. The number of units and subunits (ships, rear services organs) allocated will depend on the concept and training objectives of the command-staff exercise and also on the possibilities of conducting combat actions in deployed battle formations on the terrain. When the training grounds (training fields) are of limited size, a lesser number of combat means (tanks and armored personnel carriers) can be used and the number of guns, mortars, and other means reduced to the minimum. Under these conditions, motorized rifle subunits will carry out combat actions on foot and the supporting units and subunits will be represented only by individual tanks, guns, and mortars.

When training grounds (training fields) are available in the zone of troop actions, the units and subunits participating in the exercise use them in order to work out problems of conducting combat actions at full strength and with deployed battle formations. For example, in the VESNA-74 (SPRING-74) command-staff exercise, a motorized rifle regiment of the Soviet Army and a motorized rifle battalion of the National People's Army, utilizing a number of training grounds, operated to the entire depth of the exercise (approximately 150 kilometers). In

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doing this, the allocated units and subunits must devote their efforts to fulfilling the assigned tasks within the time limits established in the decisions and plans. In this way the realism of the decisions and calculations can be verified.

In the event specialized training is conducted with troops for the fulfilment of their tasks, their relocation and deployment can be carried out outside the framework of the planned actions. Such a form of actions of troops (naval forces, rear services organs) hardly affords the opportunity of checking the work of the commanders and staffs, but takes on the nature of demonstration exercises whose aim is to demonstrate certain combat episodes.

Under these conditions it is required that the trainee commanders and staffs do not concentrate attention exclusively on the actually participating forces and means. They must give equal measure to working out the documents and tasks for the non-participating large units, units, and subunits, and present these documents to the representational groups. Only after all tasks have been accomplished as is necessary in a field exercise, is it possible to fully assess the work of the commanders and staffs.

In the Air Forces and Air Defense of the National People's Army of the German Democratic Republic this variant in allocating troops for a command-staff exercise is employed so as to regularly work with the air defense forces of the Polish People's Republic and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, as well as with forces of the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany, on all matters of cooperation, including the acquisition, transfer, and guidance of aircraft aloft; fighter aviation operations at full range with subsequent landing at cooperating airfields, and others. In so doing, troop control is exercised using Russian as the common language of command. These exercises, as a rule, are conducted by axes with the allocation of one air defense large unit from each of the respective countries and one from the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany.

In naval forces exercises, the allocation of forces was employed primarily to work out the cooperation of the allied fleets while accomplishing combat tasks together. For example, valuable experience in efficiently accomplishing combat tasks was

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acquired in KONTAKT-73 (CONTACT-73), a combined command-staff exercise of the combat duty forces of the allied Baltic fleets.

A variant in the allocation of naval forces was also put into practice in the exercises of the antisubmarine and minesweeping forces as well as in the actions of the composite ship strike groups of all the allied Baltic fleets (in the exercise BALTIC-72). Experience has shown that this form of conducting a command-staff exercise with the employment of a relatively small number of forces and means makes it possible to attain good training results and to establish conditions which maximally approximate field exercises.

The allocation of units and subunits to command-staff exercises in order to carry out demonstration exercises

This variant in the allocation of troops to a command-staff exercise is employed primarily to demonstrate new or more complex problems of the organization and control of troops in the course of combat actions; to study and synthesize the experience acquired by the troops in employing new types of weapons and combat equipment; or to introduce new organizational structures.

This was put into practice on a wide scale in the BROTHERHOOD-IN-ARMS exercise with all of the allied armies participating. Here the troops and naval forces demonstrated their experience in the conduct of combat actions and in the employment in battle of new types of combat equipment. In compliance with the decisions of commanders, demonstration exercises can be carried out directly in the zones of actions of command-staff exercises. When this is not feasible, they are organized on a training ground outside the limits of the zone of actions of the exercise.

The preparation of the troops for the demonstration exercises is carried out, as a rule, under the direction of a specially designated group of generals and officers. When necessary, a command-staff exercise can be interrupted for the time the demonstration exercise is being conducted.

The particularly graphic nature of demonstration exercises is ensured in the case where they are combined with the work of the commanders and staffs being trained and conducted in the

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planned zone of actions.

It has been our experience that such a form of conducting a demonstration exercise is a supplemental element of a command-staff exercise. It should be utilized only in order to work on specific training matters that are a part of the overall theme.

In all of the variants in the allocation of troops and naval forces to command-staff exercises in accordance with the training objective and local conditions, one can provide for the accomplishment of drills with field firing. These are organized and conducted on the basis of the provisions of the current regulations and manuals of the branches of the armed forces.

Some experience in directing combined exercises. In order to efficiently accomplish the planned training objectives, combined exercises must be prepared purposefully and in a timely fashion in terms of content, and also from the organizational and materiel standpoint.

The documents for control must as fully as possible conform to the objective conditions of the planned combat actions and thereby ensure that exercises are conducted in a situation that closely approximates a real one. In order to ensure that in the combined exercises all fraternal armies are trained in the most realistic situation possible, it is necessary, while they are still in the stage of developing the concept, to take into account the requirements of all of the participating armies and skilfully incorporate these requirements into the background of the concept.

The advisability of this approach consists in the fact that in working out the concept, the director of the combined exercise can determine his objective, training problems, and training phases, without fearing that some new significant refinements will follow. It must also be kept in mind that only the director and his staff can make the decision on the use of a training ground and the field camps; they alone know the axis of relocation of the staffs and troops as well as the special problems of communications and, last but not least, the possibility of enlisting the local population.

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Thus, at the time of the first meeting of the representatives of the allied armies the most important questions can be clarified, with the result that, as noted above, a coordinated concept can be submitted for approval.

Similar experience has been gained by others besides the National People's Army of the German Democratic Republic. The employment of different variants in the allocation of troops also has been practiced repeatedly by other armies, for example, by the Czechoslovak People's Army while preparing the VLTAVA and SHIELD-72 combined exercises and by the Polish Armed Forces in preparing the ODER-NEISSE exercise, and other exercises.

The preparatory phase of the exercise BROTHERHOOD-IN-ARMS which, as is known, was directed by the Minister of National Defense of the German Democratic Republic, was based on principles approved by all of the fraternal armies.

In the preparation and conduct of combined exercises, combined directing body staffs, in which representatives of the participating armies act as deputy directors, proved themselves. Their assistance makes it possible to efficiently accomplish all of the matters of preparing and conducting exercises to maintain the continuous cooperation of the troops of the allied armies, to carry out the exchange of information, and because of this, to create the necessary preconditions for the achievement of good results.

In addition, combined exercises, in whose preparation there is so much close collaboration carried out, contribute to further exchanges of experience in matters of the methodology of conducting exercises, which, in the final analysis, leads to a further increase in the level of the training and combat readiness of the Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact member states.

Based on the experience we have accumulated in the preparation and conduct of many combined exercises, it seems useful to set forth the following recommendations:

-- when working up the documents on control, it would be useful to establish a working group of responsible generals and officers from the fraternal armies which would, during the

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preparatory period of the combined exercise, make all of the decisions associated with this work;

-- in order to ensure the coordinated work of the staffs, it would be advisable to set up calendar plans (network diagrams) and issue the necessary organizational instructions in a timely manner. In doing so, one should determine the sequence and specified times for drafting the major documents on control, their principal content, and the forces and means allocated for this.

So that all measures are taken into account in the preparation and conduct of the combined exercises of allied armies, it is important that the fraternal armies focus attention on the joint accomplishment of the following matters:

-- the determination of the tasks, training objectives, and phases of the exercise as well as of the complement of the forces and means allocated to work out the concept and to plan the conduct of the exercise;

-- the planning and preparation for the movement and support of the troops;

-- the organization of the directing body of the combined exercise for the accomplishment of the tasks confronting the control organs and the troops.

The preparation of the materials for the exercise should be completed in the drafting of documents on control, having ensured there is the required margin of time. This means that the last document in its final edition must be submitted no later than three to four weeks before the start of the exercise. This will make it possible for the participating fraternal armies to make the final draft of their documents based on the data received and to complete their work well before the exercise is begun.

The common political-ideological views of our armies, the unified views of the commanders and staffs on control, on the organization of combat actions, and on the control...

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
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[The remaining four paragraphs, which are largely missing, appear to sum up the article and make concluding statements as to the value of combined exercises in exploiting new weapons and organizational forms and in contributing to overall training levels among the allies.]



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